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In psychiatry, pharmacological research has played a crucial role in the formulation, revision, 
and refinement of neurobiological theories of psychopathology. Besides being utilized as 
potential treatments for various mental disorders, pharmacological drugs play an important 
epistemic role as experimental instruments that help scientists uncover the neurobiological 
underpinnings of mental disorders (Tsou, 2012). Interventions with psychiatric patients using 
pharmacological drugs provide researchers with information about the neurobiological causes of 
mental disorders that cannot be obtained in other ways. This important source of evidence for the 
biological causes of mental disorder is often overlooked in philosophical analyses of psychiatry, 
especially in skeptical analyses that debase the biological aspects of psychopathology (e.g., 
Szasz, 1960; Scheff, 1963; Laing, 1967). In discussing pharmacological interventions as a form 
of evidence for the physical basis of mental disorders, this paper aims to clarify the nature, 
reliability, and limitations of this evidence. In addition, it illustrates the central role that 
pharmacological findings in applied clinical contexts play in the acquisition of neurobiological 
knowledge in research contexts. 
The main argument advanced in this paper is that pharmacological interventions with 
clinical populations of psychiatric patients allow scientists to draw causal inferences about the 
neurobiological basis of mental disorders. While the knowledge acquired in this process is not 
infallible or immune to revision, pharmacological interventions are indispensable in the 
articulation of scientific knowledge about the neurobiological causes of mental disorders. I 
advance this argument with reference to the development of neurobiological theories of 
schizophrenia and depression in the second half of the twentieth century. My analysis of these 
historical cases emphasizes the indispensable role that pharmacological interventions played in 
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the articulation of the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia and the serotonin hypothesis of 
depression. I subsequently discuss three specific epistemic functions that pharmacological drugs 
serve in contributing to knowledge about the neurobiological basis of mental disorders: (1) 
facilitating the generation and formulation of etiological neurobiological hypotheses, (2) aiding 
in the testing and confirmation of neurobiological theories, and (3) permitting the refinement, 
elaboration, and revision of existing neurobiological theories. In the history of neurobiological 
theories of schizophrenia and depression, pharmacological drugs functioned as experimental 
instruments that realized each of these functions.  
My analysis of pharmacological interventions in psychopathology research draws on 
philosophical accounts of science that emphasize the importance of manipulability and 
intervention in experimental contexts (Cartwright, 1983, ch. 5; Hacking, 1983; Ackermann, 
1985; Franklin, 1986, 1996, 2010; Giere, 1988, ch. 5; Woodward, 2003, 2008). These 
philosophical analyses suggest that intervening with and manipulating theoretical (i.e., 
unobservable) entities in systematic ways provides philosophical reasons for believing in their 
existence (cf. Morrison, 1990). While philosophers such as Ian Hacking (1983) maintain that 
experimentation with theoretical entities (e.g., manipulating electrons in electron guns) provides 
evidence for their real existence, my analysis takes the more liberal stance that experimentation 
on entities and measuring their properties can sometimes provide reasons for believing in their 
existence (Franklin, 1996, 2010). In the case of mental disorders, my analysis suggests that there 
is defeasible evidence for believing that a mental disorder is a real theoretical entity (as opposed 
to a social construction) when it can be manipulated in systematic and predictable ways by 
pharmacological drugs. What pharmacological interventions ultimately reveal is the stable 
biological causal structure of these disorders and the specific neurobiological mechanisms that 
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underwrite them.  
 
Antipsychotic Drugs and Schizophrenia 
Knowledge about the neurobiological causes of schizophrenia is known largely through various 
pharmacological interventions with antipsychotic drugs. The first antipsychotic drug 
(chlorpromazine) was discovered by accident in the early 1950s, which was followed by the 
development of other antipsychotic drugs in the 1960s and 1970s. Pharmacologists’ attempt to 
remove the unwanted extrapyramidal side-effects associated with these first generation 
antipsychotic drugs led to the creation of second-generation, atypical antipsychotic drugs in the 
1990s. All of these developments in pharmacology were important steps in the formulation of the 
dopamine theory of schizophrenia and led to a greater understanding of the neurobiological basis 
of schizophrenia.  
 In the early 1950s, a French military surgeon, Henri Laborit, was experimenting with 
various drugs that could potentially treat surgical shock, which is an acute and sometimes fatal 
state that occurred during surgery (McKim, 2007, pp. 287-288). Laborit hypothesized that 
surgical shock is caused by the excessive release of neurotransmitters, such as epinephrine, 
acetylcholine, and histamine; and he experimented with drugs that were known to block the 
release of these substances, including various antihistamines. In 1951, Laborit was able to 
successfully treat surgical shock with an antihistamine called RP-4560 (chlorpromazine), and he 
reported that he was able to put surgical patients into an ‘artificial hibernation,’ wherein patients 
would not lose consciousness, but become sleepy and disinterested with their surroundings 
(Laborit & Huguenard, 1951). Laborit speculated about potential therapeutic applications of 
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chlorpromazine in psychiatry and suggested to some psychiatric colleagues that the drug might 
be useful for treating agitated mental patients (Ban, 2007, p. 496; Healy, 2002, pp. 81-82).     
 The most important clinical trials with chlorpromazine were conducted by two Parisan 
psychiatrists, Jean Delay and Pierre Deniker, who learned of Laborit’s trials and began using 
chlorpromazine to treat psychiatric patients (López-Muñoz et al., 2005, p. 118). In 1952, Delay 
and Deniker reported that while chlorpromazine was not successful in treating depression, it had 
dramatic therapeutic effects on patients in states of agitation, mania, mental confusion, and acute 
psychosis (López-Muñoz et al., 2005, p. 120). The researchers also reported the drug’s capacity 
to slow motor activity, cause affective indifference, and neutralize emotions as a ‘neuroleptic 
syndrome’ (Delay & Deniker, 1952).  
In November 1952, chlorpromazine was made available for prescription in France under 
the tradename Largactil, which made the drug widely available to clinicians and psychiatrists 
around the world (Shen, 1999, pp. 408-409). In 1954, Heinz Lehmann, a German born Canadian 
psychiatrist, suggested that chlorpromazine worked by selectively inhibiting ‘affective drive’ 
(Lehmann, 1954; Lehmann & Hanrahan, 1954), and his research was highly influential in 
promoting the use of chlorpromazine in North American psychiatry. By the end of 1955, 
successful treatment of schizophrenic patients with chlorpromazine were reported in numerous 
countries in the world, including Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, Hungary, Canada, 
Peru, the United States, Australia, and the Soviet Union (Ban, 2007, p. 296). In 1957, the 
American Public Health Association jointly awarded the prestigious Lasker Prize for Medicine to 
Laborit, Deniker, and Lehmann for discovering the antipsychotic properties of chlorpromazine 
(Ban, 1994; Healy, 2002, pp. 125-128).  
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 The success in treating schizophrenic patients with chlorpromazine in the 1950s 
stimulated the search for other antipsychotic drugs, and a number of other drugs with similar 
antipsychotic effects (e.g., thioridazine, fluphenazine, haloperidol) were developed in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Healy, 2004, pp. 96-7). A common problem with these first-generation (“typical”) 
antipsychotic drugs was the presence of unwanted motor side-effects or extrapyramidal 
symptoms (EPS) that resemble the symptoms of Parkinson’s disease; EPS include symptoms 
such as muscular rigidity (dystonia), abnormal motion of voluntary and involuntary muscles 
(dyskinesia), inability to initiate movement (akinesia), inability to remain still (akasthesia), and 
tremors (Kring et al., 2007, p. 375). In a 1961 report, the prevalence of EPS among patients 
treated with antipsychotic drugs was estimated to be 38.9% (Ayd, 1961), and many 
pharmacologists at the time believed that there was an absolute inverse relationship between the 
clinical efficacy of an antipsychotic drug and EPS, with stronger antipsychotic effect being 
associated with more EPS (Shen, 1999, p. 409). This belief was refuted with the development of 
second-generation (“atypical”) antipsychotic drugs. 
 While the first atypical antipsychotic drug was first synthesized in 1958, these drugs were 
not significantly utilized in clinical settings until the 1990s because of concerns regarding their 
safety. The first atypical antipsychotic drug that was developed was clozapine. This drug was 
developed by a research team directed by Hanns Hippius in Switzerland, who—in the early 
1960s—were attempting to refute the common pharmacological belief that EPS and strength of 
antipsychotic effect were causally linked (Hippius, 1996). Several clinical trials indicated that 
clozapine had a strong antipsychotic effect with minimal EPS (Bente et al., 1966; Gross and 
Langer, 1966; Angst et al., 1971), which demonstrated that the clinical efficacy of antipsychotic 
drugs could be decoupled from their unwanted side-effects. Clozapine was introduced in clinical 
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settings in a number of European countries in the late-1960s; however, it was withdrawn from 
the market in many countries by the mid-1970s due to concerns that agranulocytosis (i.e., a life-
threatening lowering of white blood cells) was caused by clozapine treatment (Healy, 2002, pp. 
238-244). In the following decade, fears about the safety of clozapine allayed, and it became 
understood that agranulocytosis would appear for a small percentage of patients, but fatalities 
could be avoided through close blood monitoring (Hippius, 1989, p. S4). In the United States, the 
introduction of clozapine was facilitated by a landmark study that demonstrated the effectiveness 
of clozapine (compared to chlorpromazine) on treatment-resistant schizophrenic patients (Kane 
et al., 1988). After clozapine was introduced in the US, a number of other atypical antipsychotic 
drugs (e.g., risperidone, olanzapine, aripiprazole) were quickly developed in the 1990s and 2000s 
(Janowsky, 2004, pp. 80-81); all antipsychotic drugs currently under development are of the 
atypical type. 
 In addition to being employed as tools for treating schizophrenic patients, antipsychotic 
drugs—and pharmacological drugs more generally—function as experimental instruments for 
identifying the neurobiological causes of schizophrenia. In particular, pharmacological 
interventions with schizophrenic patients have played a central epistemic role in the formulation, 
revision, and refinement of the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia, which has been the 
dominant neurobiological theory of schizophrenia since the 1970s (Kring et al., 2007, pp. 363-
365; Carlson, 2008, pp. 460-466). In its original formulation, the dopamine hypothesis suggested 
that the symptoms of schizophrenia are caused by excessive activity of the neurotransmitter 
dopamine. Since the early 1980s, the symptoms of schizophrenia have been distinguished into 
‘positive symptoms’ and ‘negative symptoms’ (Strauss, Carpenter, and Bartko, 1974; Wing, 
1978; Crow, 1980a, 1980b; Andreason and Olsen, 1982): 
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(1) Positive symptoms (psychological excesses): delusions, hallucinations, and 
disordered thought. 
(2) Negative symptoms (psychological deficits): flattened emotions, poverty of speech, 
lack of motivation, and social withdrawal. 
As discussed below, a more refined formulation of the dopamine hypothesis maintains that the 
positive (psychotic) symptoms of schizophrenia are caused by excessive dopamine activity. 
Evidence for this qualified dopamine hypothesis is supported by various pharmacological 
interventions. All antipsychotic drugs—typical and atypical—that can successfully treat the 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia are dopamine antagonists that decrease the activity of 
dopamine. A key discovery in the 1970s that further implicated the role of dopamine was the 
finding that the clinical efficacy of typical antipsychotics (e.g., chlorpromazine, haloperidol) is 
directly related to their affinity for dopamine receptors (Seeman et al., 1975). Indirect evidence 
for the dopamine hypothesis was provided by the fact that typical antipsychotic drugs cause EPS 
similar to the symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, and Parkinson’s is known to be cause, in part, by 
low levels of dopamine (Kring et al., 2007, p. 363). Another important piece of evidence was the 
finding in the early 1970s that stimulant drugs (e.g., amphetamine, cocaine) with opposite 
pharmacological effects as antipsychotics (i.e., dopamine agonists), when taken in sufficiently 
large doses, induce an ‘amphetamine psychosis’ that is indistinguishable from the positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia; and this state can be treated with antipsychotic drugs (Ellinwood, 
1967; Ellinwood, Sudilovsky, and Nelson, 1973). 
 In the early 1990s, a further elaboration of the dopamine hypothesis was articulated in a 
landmark paper (Davis et al, 1991), which expanded the scope of the original dopamine 
hypothesis by theorizing about different dopamine systems and receptors (Healy, 2002, chs. 5–
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6). This revised dopamine hypothesis suggests that excessive dopamine activity in the 
mesolimbic pathway is responsible for the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, while deficient 
dopamine activity in the mesocortical pathway is responsible for the negative symptoms. The 
mesolimbic dopamine pathway (which is involved in motivation and reinforcement) is a neural 
pathway that originates in the ventral tegmental area and projects to the hypothalamus, 
amygdala, hippocampus, and nucleus accumbens (Kring et al., 2007, p. 364; McKim, 2007, pp. 
289–290). The original hypothesis that schizophrenia is caused by excessive dopamine activity 
was refined to the narrower hypothesis that the positive symptoms are caused by excessive 
dopamine activity in the mesolimbic pathway. This excessive activity is theorized to be caused 
by hyperstimulation of D2 dopamine receptors (the main dopamine receptor in this pathway) 
given that antipsychotic drugs exert their therapeutic effect by blocking D2 receptors (Abi-
Dargham, 2004). The revised dopamine hypothesis also suggests that deficient dopamine activity 
in the mesocortical pathway—and in particular, the prefrontal cortex—results in the 
hypostimulation of D1 receptors (the main dopamine receptor subtype in this area), which is 
responsible for the negative symptoms and cognitive impairments associated with schizophrenia 
(Abi-Dargham, 2004). The mesocortical dopamine pathway originates in the ventral tegmental 
area and projects to the prefrontal cortex (Kring et al., 2007, p. 364). The hypothesis that 
negative symptoms are caused by deficient dopamine activity in the mesocortical pathway is 
supported by the facts that cognitive impairment is associated with dysfunction in the prefrontal 
cortex (the terminal region of the mesocortical pathway) and dopamine depletion in the 
prefrontal cortext (using dopamine antagonists) in animals induces cognitive impairment 
(Sawaguichi and Goldman-Rakic, 1994). Moreover, deficits in dopamine activity in the 
mesocortical pathway are causally related to excessive dopamine activity in the mesolimbic 
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pathway. The prefrontal cortex projects to limbic areas innervated by dopamine such that 
deficient dopamine activity in the prefrontal cortex fails to exert inhibitory control over 
dopamine neurons in the limbic area, resulting in excessive dopamine activity in the mesolimbic 
system (Kring et al., 2007, pp. 364–365; Carlson, 2008, pp. 468–469). Hence, the original 
dopamine hypothesis posited in the 1970s was expanded from the hypothesis that schizophrenia 
is caused by excessive dopamine activity to the theory that schizophrenia is caused by a 
dysregulation of dopamine, with deficiency of dopamine activity in the prefrontal cortex 
resulting in an excess of dopamine activity in the mesolimbic pathway. While dysregulation of 
dopamine cannot tell the complete story about schizophrenia (Kendler and Schaffner, 2011), 
abnormalities in the dopamine system are undoubtedly an important causal factor in 
schizophrenia.  
 
Antidepressant Drugs and Depression 
Like schizophrenia, knowledge about the neurobiological basis of depression is largely known 
through various pharmacological interventions with antidepressant drugs. The antidepressant 
properties of the first two classes of antidepressant drugs (i.e., monoamine oxidase inhibitors and 
tricyclic antidepressants) were discovered by accident in the 1950s. The attempt to develop safer 
antidepressants with fewer side-effects led to the self-conscious design of second-generation 
antidepressants (i.e., selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors), which were introduced to the 
market in the 1980s. All of these pharmacological developments in antidepressant drugs 
contributed to the formulation of the serotonin theory of depression and our current 
understanding of the neurobiological basis of depression. 
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 The first successful antidepressant drug was iproniazid, and its antidepressant properties 
were discovered by accident while it was being experimented on as a potential treatment for 
tuberculosis (Hirschfeld, 2000). In 1952, during clinical trials of iproniazid for tuberculosis 
patients in the United States, it was discovered that this drug significantly elevated the mood of 
patients; subsequent trials established that this antidepressant effect was independent of its ability 
to treat tuberculosis (McKim, 2007, pp. 301–302). In 1957, at a meeting of the American 
Psychiatric Association in Syracuse, New York, data on the effectiveness of iproniazid to treat 
depression was presented. A year after this meeting, over 400,000 patients affected by depression 
had been treated with the drug, despite the fact that iproniazid was being marketed as an 
antitubercular agent (Lόpez-Muñoz and Alamo, 2009, p. 1566–1567). Iproniazid turned out to be 
the first of the monoamine oxidase inhibitor (MAOI) antidepressants, and research into other 
MAOIs (e.g., isocarboxazid, phenelzine, tranylcypromine) to treat depression soon followed 
(Lόpez-Muñoz et al., 2007, p. 557). While MAOIs were widely used in the 1960s, enthusiasm 
for them waned by the 1970s because of concerns about MAOIs causing liver damage and 
potentially dangerous interactions with other drugs and foods. Newer MAOIs have been 
developed that are more specific in their actions, reversible, and less likely to interact with foods 
(McKim, 2007, p. 301).          
 Another class of antidepressant drugs that were developed in the 1950s were tricyclic 
antidepressant (TCA) drugs, which were discovered by accident during trials to test 
antipsychotic drugs (Healy, 1997, ch. 2). In the mid-1950s, the (typical) antipsychotic drug 
impramine was being tested on schizophrenic patients in Switzerland; while this drug was not 
effective at treating psychosis, it was found to elevate the mood of depressed patients (McKim, 
2007, p. 301). Subsequent trials by Roland Kuhn, who was Medical Director at the Psychiatric 
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Clinic of Thurgau Canton, indicated that imipramine could improve the mood of depressed 
patients (Lόpez-Muñoz and Alamo, 2009, pp. 1569–1571). By 1958, the antidepressant effects of 
imipramine were confirmed and it was placed on the market in Europe. In North America, the 
use of imipramine to treat depression was initiated by Heinz Lehmann, who conducted a study 
on impipramine on depressed patients that allowed the drug to be marketed in the United States 
(Lehmann, Cahn, and De Verteuil, 1958). A landmark study published in 1965 (Klerman and 
Cole, 1965) demonstrated that imipramine was superior to placebo in the treatment of 
depression. Following the clinical success of imipramine, a number of other TCAs (e.g., 
desipramine, protryptyline, clomipramine) were developed in the 1960s (Fangmann et al., 2008). 
The unwanted side-effects of TCAs, due to their cardiotoxicity and anticholinergic properties, 
spurned the search for other antidepressants.  
 Unlike the fortuitous discovery of the antidepressant properties of MAOIs and TCAs, 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants were developed following a 
procedure of directed design (Wong, Perry, and Bymaster, 2005). MAOIs and TCAs provided 
crucial information regarding what kinds of pharmacological actions were causing antidepressant 
effects, which allowed pharmacologists to design drugs that would have effects at a specific 
locus of action (Lόpez-Muñoz and Alamo, 2009, pp. 1576–1578). In the 1970s, the American 
pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly synthesized the SSRI, fluoxetine. A pioneering paper by 
David Wong’s research group at Lilly described the actions of fluoexetine on reuptake systems 
and discussed the potential of this drug for understanding serotonin function and for treating 
depression (Wong et al., 1974). In 1980, Lilly committed to studying fluoexetine and enlisted the 
psychiatrist John Feighner to conduct clinical trials on the drug. These studies suggested that 
fluoexetine was as effective as TCAs, but with far fewer adverse side-effects, which led Feighner 
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to write of the “new generation of antidepressants” (Feighner, 1983). In 1987, the FDA approved 
of the clinical use of fluoexetine, which was marketed under the tradename Prozac; by 1990, 
fluoexetine was the most widely prescribed drug by North American psychiatrists (Lόpez-Muñoz 
and Alamo, 2009, p. 1578). Following the clinical success of fluoexetine, other SSRIs (e.g., 
citalopram, sertraline, paroxetine) were quickly placed on the market (Lόpez-Muñoz and Alamo, 
2009, p. 1578). 
 As in the case of antipsychotic drugs and schizophrenia, pharmacological interventions 
with antidepressant drugs have been crucial experimental tools in uncovering the neurobiological 
basis of depression (Tsou, 2013). In particular, pharmacological research played a central role in 
the discovery, articulation, and revision of the monoamine hypothesis of depression. The first 
articulation of the monoamine hypothesis in the 1960s suggested that depression is caused by 
deficient activity of monoamine neurotransmitters: norepinephrine (NE), serotonin (5-HT), and 
dopamine (DA). The monoamine hypothesis was formulated largely based on the fact that 
MAOIs and TCAs that can relieve the signs of depression are monoamine agonists that increase 
the activity of monoamine neurotransmitters. Furthermore, monoamine antagonist drugs with 
opposite pharmacological effects of the first-generation antidepressants (e.g., reserpine) can 
induce depressive symptoms in non-depressed individuals (Sachar and Baron, 1979).  
By the end of the 1960s, the monoamine hypothesis became revised to the serotonin 
hypothesis of depression. The serotonin hypothesis suggests that depression is caused by 
deficient activity of serotonin in the serotonin pathway that begins in the Raphé nuclei and 
projects through the medial forebrain bundle to the forebrain (McKim, 2007, p. 304). This 
hypothesis gained support among researchers after studies demonstrated the powerful inhibition 
of serotonin reuptake in imipramine and other TCAs, which function to increase serotonin 
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activity (Lόpez-Muñoz and Alamo, 2009, p. 1577). The serotonin hypothesis was also supported 
by the fact that SSRIs, which also function to increase the activity of serotonin, are effective at 
alleviating depression among a broad range of patients, although their relative efficacy among 
patients with severe depression is controversial (Hirschfeld, 2000).  
Besides pharmacological research, the serotonin hypothesis of depression is also 
supported a number of other independent findings. Lower production of and release of serotonin 
in the brain is correlated with decreased Cerebrospinal Fluid (CSF) levels of 5-
hydroxindoleacectic acid (5-HIAA), which is the main metabolite of serotonin; studies have 
shown significantly lower CSF levels of 5-IAA among individuals who have attempted suicide, 
and lower levels of 5-HIAA are correlated with a higher number of suicide attempts (Åsberg, 
Träskmann, & Thorén, 1976; Roy, De Jong, & Linnoila, 1989; Träskmann et al., 1981). Post-
mortem studies have identified increased numbers of postsynaptic serotonin receptors (e.g., 5-
HT1A and 5-HT2A receptors), in the prefrontal cortex of suicide victims, possibly due to a 
compensatory response to reduced serotonin activity (Mann, 1998, p. 26). Moreover, tryptophan 
depletion studies have demonstrated that lowering levels of tryptophan (the main precursor to 
serotonin), which lowers serotonin levels in individuals, causes temporary depressive symptoms 
among individuals with a history of depression, but not for individuals without a history of 
depression (Benkelfat et al., 1994; Johnson et al., 2009, pp. 203–204; Moore at al., 2000). This 
suggests that the diminished serotonin activity implicated in depression is due to insensitive 
postsynaptic serotonin receptors. The theory that diminished serotonin activity is due to 
insensitive serotonin receptors rather than lower absolute levels of serotonin is supported by the 
pharmacological finding that antidepressants increase levels of neurotransmitters immediately, 
however, it takes about two weeks (when neurotransmitter levels have returned to their baseline 
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levels) before patients experience relief from antidepressant treatment; it is also supported by 
metabolic studies that indicate that some individuals with depression do not show evidence of 
abnormal absolute neurotransmitter levels (Kring et al., 2007, pp. 238–240). While the serotonin 
hypothesis is inevitably an oversimplification, diminished activity in the serotonin system is 
likely to be involved in depression.   
 
Pharmacological Interventions and the Neurobiology of Mental Disorders 
In the history of twentieth century psychiatry, the development of effective pharmacological 
treatments for disorders such as schizophrenia and depression played an important role in 
demonstrating the physical basis of mental disorders and moving psychiatry away from the 
psychoanalytic and dualist assumptions that dominated American psychiatry until the 1960s. 
Psychoanalysis enjoyed a period of prestige within American psychiatry from the post-war 
period until its eventual decline in the 1960s and 1970s (Grob, 1991; Hale, 1995). The 
“psychopharmacological revolution” of the 1950s (Baumeister and Hawkins, 2005; Bhatara, 
Lόpez-Muñoz, and Gupta, 2005), which featured the pioneering use of pharmacological drugs to 
treat schizophrenia and depression, was a major contributing factor in the demise of 
psychoanalysis. Within psychoanalytically oriented psychiatry, mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia and depression were conceived of as the externalization of subconscious and 
traumatic personality conflicts, and it was thought that genuine treatment required patients to 
discover the roots of their internal conflicts (Lόpez-Muñoz and Alamo, 2009). From this 
perspective, the development of pharmacological drugs to treat mental disorders was regarded 
with skepticism by psychoanalysts since it was thought that these drugs would merely mask the 
symptoms of these disorders and these drugs could not address the underlying mental conflicts 
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that genuine treatment required. The success of pharmacological treatments for mental disorders 
contributed to the debunking of these psychoanalytic and dualist assumptions and, eventually, to 
the replacement of psychoanalytically-oriented psychiatry with biological psychiatry.  
 In addition to their contribution to demonstrating the physical basis for some mental 
disorders, pharmacological drugs played a crucial epistemic role in as experimental instruments 
that allowed researchers to formulate the first biological, etiological theories about mental 
disorders. Pharmacological drugs facilitated the formulation of neurobiological hypotheses by 
allowing researchers to draw inferences about the neurobiological causes of mental disorders 
based on how clinical populations of patients responded to particular drug interventions. In this 
process, drugs operate as instruments or technologies that reveal important causal regularities 
underlying mental disorders. In the case of schizophrenia, the fact that typical antipsychotic 
drugs are dopamine antagonists facilitated the formulation of the original dopamine hypothesis 
that maintained that schizophrenia is caused by excessive dopamine activity. In depression, the 
fact that first generation antidepressants are monoamine agonists facilitated the formulation of 
the monoamine hypothesis that maintained that depression is caused by deficient activity of 
monoamine neurotransmitters.  
The way in which pharmacological interventions facilitate the generation of 
neurobiological hypotheses exemplifies the interventionist kind of causal reasoning that has been 
examined comprehensively by James Woodward (2003). Woodward (2003, ch. 2) advocates a 
manipulability account of causation that maintains that variable A (e.g., excessive dopamine 
activity) is a cause of variable B (e.g., psychotic symptoms) if an intervention that can change the 
value of A (e.g., administering antipsychotic drugs that decrease dopamine activity) results in a 
17 
 
corresponding change in the value of B (e.g., alleviation of psychotic symptoms). This account of 
causation is motivated, in part, to capture the role of experimentation in causal inference. On 
Woodward’s view, experimentation is relevant to the generation of causal claims because these 
claims have implications concerning what would happen to B under appropriate interventions of 
A. This view indicates that scientists can distinguish genuine causal relationships between 
variables (from mere correlations) by way of experimental interventions (cf. Thagard, 1999, chs. 
7–8). From this perspective, pharmacological drugs can be viewed as facilitating the generation 
and formulation of causal hypotheses by providing a means of manipulating variables (e.g., 
neurobiological variables) that are causally relevant to the appearance of mental disorders.  
 A related but distinct experimental function of pharmacological drugs is to aid in the 
testing and confirmation of neurobiological theories. In this epistemic role, pharmacological 
interventions provide a crucial source of evidence for believing a neurobiological theory, or 
conversely, reasons for rejecting or revising a theory. For example, the revised dopamine 
hypothesis that maintains that schizophrenia is caused by a dysregulation of dopamine implies at 
least two sub-theses: 
(1) The positive (psychotic) symptoms of schizophrenia are caused by excessive 
dopamine activity in the mesolimbic pathway. 
(2) The negative symptoms of schizophrenia are caused by deficient dopamine activity in 
the mesocortical pathway (especially the prefrontal cortex). 
Both of these sub-theses are supported by multiple lines of pharmacological research. For 
example, sub-thesis (1) is primarily supported by the findings that: (i) antipsychotic drugs that 
decrease dopamine activity in the mesolimbic pathway can alleviate positive symptoms, (ii) the 
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antipsychotic effect of such drugs is directly correlated with dopamine blockade strength, (iii) 
typical antipsychotic drugs exert their influence by blocking D2 dopamine receptors, and (iv) 
dopamine agonists that increase dopamine activity in the mesolimbic pathway can induce 
positive symptoms. Taken together, these various pharmacological findings constitute cogent 
evidence for believing sub-thesis (1).  
The way in which pharmacological interventions aid in the confirmation of a 
neurobiological hypothesis is amenable to philosophical analyses that suggest that a hypothesis is 
better supported by evidence when multiple lines of independent research converge upon a 
unified hypothesis (e.g., see Wimsatt, 1981, 2007, ch. 4; Hacking, 1981; Franklin and Howson, 
1984; Culp, 1994, 1995; Wylie, 2002, ch. 14; Chang, 2004, ch. 1; Staley, 2004; Stegenga, 2009; 
Soler et al., 2012). These analyses maintain that a scientific hypothesis or theory is “robust” (i.e., 
well-confirmed) when multiple lines of (at least partially) independent research all point to a 
common result. The revised dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia is robust insofar as multiple 
lines of independent research support the theory that schizophrenia is caused by a dysregulation 
of dopamine in the mesolimbic and mesocortical systems. In this regard, it is important to state 
that pharmacological interventions only constitute one important part of a larger assemblage of 
research that contributes to the confirmation of a theory. For example, sub-thesis (2) of the 
dopamine hypothesis is supported by the findings that: (i) typical antipsychotic drugs, which 
decrease dopamine activity in the prefrontal cortex, exacerbate negative symptoms and cause 
cognitive impairment, (ii) atypical antipsychotic drugs, which increase dopamine activity in the 
prefrontal cortex, can alleviate negative symptoms, (iii) NMDA antagonists, which depress 
dopamine activity in the prefrontal cortex, cause cognitive impairment, (iv) the prefrontal cortex 
plays a role in speech, decision making, and goal-directed behaviors, which are all disrupted in 
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schizophrenia, (v) cognitive impairment is associated deficient dopamine activity in the 
prefrontal cortex, (vi) schizophrenic patients perform poorly on cognitive tasks designed to 
measure functions promoted by the prefrontal region, and (vii) brain imaging studies 
demonstrate that schizophrenic patients fail to show activation in the dorsal prefrontal cortex 
while performing cognitive tasks (Kring et al., 2007, pp. 366–367; Carlson, 2008, p. 466–467). 
Within this research, (i)–(iii) are obtained through interventions with pharmacological drugs, 
whereas (iv)–(vii) are obtained using alternative research methods (e.g., brain imaging studies, 
cognitive task studies). Similarly, the serotonin hypothesis of depression is supported by various 
pharmacological interventions, but it is also supported by research adopting alternative research 
methods (e.g., brain-imaging studies, post-mortem studies, tryptophan depletion studies). This 
clarifies the sense in which pharmacological interventions play an important—but only partial—
role in facilitating the testing and confirmation of neurobiological theories of mental disorders 
(cf. Bechtel, 2008, pp. 34–39).  
 An especially valuable epistemic role that pharmacological interventions play in 
psychiatric research is to promote the refinement, elaboration, and revision of neurobiological 
theories. In the development of neurobiological theories of schizophrenia and depression, 
pharmacological drugs played a central role in the elaboration and expansion of these theories. In 
this process, researchers used the known causal effects of various drugs to revise and refine 
neurobiological theories (e.g., the revision of the monoamine hypothesis to the serotonin 
hypothesis of depression). Moreover, knowledge about the different clinical profiles of various 
drugs—in conjunction with knowledge about different neurotransmitter systems in the brain—
allowed researchers to identify distinct neurobiological causes for different symptoms of mental 
disorders (e.g., the positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia). An important technique 
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that researchers utilized to gain such knowledge was the comparison of drugs with clinical 
profiles that varied in slight ways (e.g., having a weaker serotonin blockade effect, having a 
higher affinity for D2 receptors), which allowed for causal inferences to be drawn based on the 
differential response of patients to such drugs.  
The way in which pharmacological interventions facilitate the refinement and revision of 
neurobiological theories of mental disorders highlights the dynamic and interactive relationship 
between clinical contexts (applied science) and research contexts (pure science) in psychiatry. 
While pharmacological research is motivated primarily to design better pharmacological 
treatments in clinical contexts (e.g., creating drugs with fewer unwanted side-effects), the drugs 
that are developed often play a crucial role in assisting researchers to expand and revise existing 
neurobiological theories of mental disorders in research contexts. Martin Carrier (2004a, 2010) 
has argued that the aims of applied science (viz., pragmatic control)—which are embedded in a 
particular context of interests, values, and practical problems—do not necessarily compromise 
the aims of pure science (viz., knowledge acquisition). Moreover, he suggests that innovative 
discoveries in pure science often arise through applied research projects, which is a process he 
calls application innovation (Carrier, 2004a, 2004b, 2010). The ways in which neurobiological 
theories of mental disorders have been expanded and revised through applied research in 
pharmacology represents a particularly salient example of application innovation. Conversely, 
theoretical innovations in neurobiological research often feed back into applied contexts to 
facilitate the development of better pharmacological treatments (Thagard, 2003, 2008). This 
highlights the manner in which applied and pure contexts in psychiatry stand in an interactive 





This paper examined the ways in which pharmacological interventions with psychiatric patients 
have played a central role in the formulation, testing, and elaboration of neurobiological theories 
of schizophrenia and depression. In this process, pharmacological drugs function as experimental 
instruments that allow researchers to draw causal inferences about the neural pathways and 
activities responsible for the psychological and behavioral signs of mental disorders (e.g., 
delusions, feelings of sadness, cognitive impairment). This analysis also emphasized how 
innovative pharmacological developments in clinical contexts (i.e., in the development of 
pharmacological treatments for mental disorders) serve to further knowledge in research contexts 
(i.e., in the evolution of neurobiological theories of mental disorders). While the knowledge 
acquired in this process is not known with certainty or immune from revision, pharmacological 
interventions with clinical populations of psychiatric patients have provided an indispensable 
source of evidence in the articulation of modern biological theories of mental disorders. 
 Seen from a broader historical perspective, pharmacological interventions with 
psychiatric patients paved the path towards a physical understanding of mental disorders. In 
particular, the psychopharmacology revolution contributed to the downfall of psychoanalytic and 
dualist theories of psychopathology in the 1960s and 1970s, and it set the foundations for the 
emerging biological approach to psychiatry that would eventually supplant psychoanalysis. The 
psychopharmacological revolution—through its influence on neurobiology—also contributed to 
the idea that many psychological constructs examined by psychiatrists that were thought to be 
ineliminably “mental” (e.g., ‘delusion,’ ‘sadness’) could be explained and understood in physical 
terms. While this does not imply that social and psychological variables are unimportant in the 
study of psychopathology or the treatment of mental disorders, it does suggest that the attempt to 
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study psychopathology purely at the level of a non-physical “mental realm” that is inaccessible 




This chapter draws on materials originally developed in Tsou (2012, 2013). I am grateful to Ian 
Hacking, William Wimsatt, Emma Tobin, and Philip Seeman for helpful comments and 
suggestions on issues discussed in this chapter. 
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